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Abstract 
Changes in the legislation in mid-80s in Portugal provide remarkable conditions for 
economic analysis, as the minimum wage increased very sharply for a very specific group 
of workers. Relying on a matched employer-employee panel dataset, we model gross job 
flows — accessions and separations — in continuing firms, as well as in new firms and 
those going out of business, using a Poisson regression model applied to proportions. 
Worker behaviour is as well modelled. Employment trends for teenagers, the affected 
group, are contrasted against older workers, before and after the rise in the youth 
minimum wage. 
The major effect on teenagers of a rising minimum wage is the reduction of separations 
from the employer, which compensates for the reduction of accessions (to new and 
continuing firms) and the rising dismissals from firms closing down. This result suggests 
the relevance of supply side factors overcoming demand forces, as they indicate that job 
attachment for low wage youngsters rises following an increase in their minimum wage. In 
this sense, our results can reconcile some of the previous evidence that has been 
presented in the empirical literature when analysing the overall impact of the minimum 
wage on youth employment without looking at its sources. 
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1. Introduction 
When analysing the impact of the minimum wage, labour economists have 
invariably been constrained by two types of factors. On one hand, the impact of 
the minimum wage is hard to isolate from that of other economic forces. Ideally, 
the conditions for quasi-experiments should be met, in which case changes in the 
minimum wage would affect strictly a specific group of workers (treatment group), 
subject to conditions otherwise similar to other workers (control group), a situation 
that very rarely occurs in economics. The studies by Card and Krueger (1994, 
1995) and Katz and Krueger (1992) have become famous examples of that 
methodology. However, even when changes in the minimum wage are large, 
unpredictable and affect just a particular group of workers, the study to be 
undertaken still depends crucially on the data available, in particular its quality and 
detail. 
On both of these fronts, our study relies on unusually good conditions, enabling 
the development of the analysis into directions left unexplored by previous 
studies. 
In 1987, the minimum wage for workers aged 17 increased in Portugal by 50% 
strictly due to changes in the legislation, as it was raised from half to 75% of the 
full minimum wage. Also in 1987, the minimum wage for workers aged 18 or 19 
was raised from 75% to the full minimum wage rate, therefore increasing by 33% 
due to legal changes ceteris paribus. Instead of defining a priori youngsters as a 
proxy for the group of workers more severely hit by a rising general minimum 
wage, this study is motivated by a rise in the minimum wage specifically for 
youngsters, and we are able to directly evaluate the impact on their employment 
against different control groups. 
Longitudinal data matching workers and firms and covering the population of 
wage-earners in the manufacturing and services private sector in Portugal will be 
used. 
Relying on this large panel data set we can, first of all, quantify and model gross 
job flows at the firm level. Several studies of the impact of the minimum wage 
have quantified and explained net job flows at the firm level (Card and Krueger 
1994, Katz and Krueger 1992, Pereira 1999). Given that we are able to follow, not 
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just firms, but workers as well, our study adds to the previous literature by 
quantifying and modelling employer behaviour regarding both accessions and 
separations. The analysis is not restricted to firms remaining in business, focusing 
also on new firms and those closing down. We can therefore disentangle the 
minimum wage puzzle, by identifying exactly where and how the minimum wage 
bites: Do employers dismiss mainly youngsters, following a rise in the youth 
minimum wage? Or is it the case that youngsters become under-represented 
among the newly hired workers? Do firms that are about to be set up, which are 
free to choose their labour force from the available pool of workers, hire relatively 
less youngsters than comparable firms before the minimum wage had been 
raised? Does a rising minimum wage place unbearable constraints on the firms, 
contributing to firm closure? Identification of the precise source for changing 
employment levels can reconcile some of the evidence that has previously been 
presented in the literature as contradictory. 
Secondly, we will rely on micro data on workers to follow a line of analysis 
previously used by Abowd et al (1999), Zavodny (2000) and Currie and Fallick 
(1996). At the individual level, we can provide a direct answer to the question: are 
the workers directly affected by a rise in the minimum wage less likely to keep 
their jobs? 
Section 2 provides a detailed description of the institutional framework in Portugal 
and the changes that took place in the minimum wage. Section 3 overviews 
changes in the wage distribution and in employment. Section 4.1 models job 
accessions and job separations in continuing firms, whereas section 4.2 performs 
a similar exercise for new firms and for firms closing down. Worker behaviour is 
the subject of section 5 and in the last part of the paper concluding comments are 
presented. 
2. Institutional framework 
The national minimum wage was set in 1974, covering at the time workers aged 
20 or older and excluding agriculture and domestic work. Ever since, it has been 
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annually updated by the parliament, under government proposal1. Decisions on 
the level of the minimum wage are taken on a discretionary basis, usually taking 
into account past and predicted inflation and after consulting the social partners. It 
is defined as a monthly wage. 
Since it was first enacted, the minimum wage has undergone several changes, 
which can be summarised as follows2: 
– Industry coverage: in 1977, it was extended to cover workers in agriculture, 
though their wage rate was lower; the following year, domestic work was 
covered as well, at a rate lower than agriculture. In 1991, the agricultural and 
the general minimum wages were harmonised and in 1998 the same 
happened to domestic work. 
Raising the minimum wage for agriculture and for domestic work to the general 
level took place gradually and the full harmonisation was therefore highly 
predictable. As such, these changes in the legislation do not provide the 
conditions for a quasi-experiment to study the impact of changes in the 
minimum wage. Also, the coverage of agriculture in the data set used is low. 
– Firm size coverage: small firms outside agriculture with fewer than 5 workers 
were allowed to pay the lower minimum set for agriculture, a possibility 
introduced in 1978 and revoked in 1991. Before 1978, several regimes had 
existed: in 1974, firms with fewer than 5 workers were exempted; in 1975 and 
1976, firms with fewer than 10 workers were declared exempted as well; in 
1977 firms with fewer than 10 workers outside agriculture were allowed to pay 
the minimum set for agriculture, if they proved to be on difficult financial 
situation. 
On request, firms claiming that the application of the new minimum wage 
would make them undergo an unbearable rise in labour costs, could as well be 
allowed to pay the minimum wage set for agriculture. This possibility was 
introduced in 1978. In 1987, only firms with fewer than 50 workers were 
                                            
1
 The only exceptions were 1982, when it was not updated, and 1989, when it was updated twice. 
2
 Throughout the period, minimum wage reductions applied to handicapped workers. 
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eligible for this reduction, and the firm size benchmark was lowered to 30 
workers in 1988, 20 workers in 1989 and it was revoked in 1990. 
Since the minimum wage for agriculture and the general one had been 
gradually harmonised, the abolition of these exemptions did not lead to a 
remarkable rise in the applicable minimum wage. On the other hand, the data 
set does not allow identification of the firms that were requesting and using the 
latter minimum wage reduction, and it is thus not feasible to study the impact 
of these changes. 
– Age coverage: the ages subject to exemption, as well as the percentage of 
exemption, changed several times, and a clearer description can be provided 
by a table. The major changes are highlighted in bold. 
Table 1 – Share of the general minimum wage enforced, according to the age of the worker 
age Æ 
year È 15 16 17 18 19 20-25 
1979 to 1986 50% 50% 50% 75% 75% 100% 
1987 50% 50% 75% 100% (80% if apprentice) 
100% 
(80% if apprentice) 
100% 
(80% if apprentice) 
1988 75% 75% 75% 100% (80% if apprentice) 
100% 
(80% if apprentice) 
100% 
(80% if apprentice) 
Source: Portugal, Diário da República, several issues. 
Figure 1 provides a longitudinal perspective, clarifying the changes in the 
exemptions to the minimum wage applied to a worker in Portugal, as he/she 
grows older. 
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Figure 1 – Growth in nominal minimum wage for different age categories, 1986-91 
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Three changes in the legislation have yielded remarkable wage increases for the 
ages involved: 
– first of all, in 1987 the minimum wage for workers aged 17 increased by 
50% due to changes in the legislation ceteris paribus, as it was raised from 
half to 75% of the full minimum wage; 
– secondly, also in 1987, the minimum wage for workers aged 18 or 19 was 
raised from 75% of the minimum wage to the full minimum, therefore 
increasing by 33% due to legal changes ceteris paribus; 
– the third change took place the following year, in 1988, as the minimum 
wage for workers aged 16 or less was raised from 50% to 75% of the full 
minimum, thus increasing by 50% due to changes in the legal setting ceteris 
paribus. 
Exceptions could however apply to the second change described, if the worker 
was an apprentice, in which case he would be entitled to 80% of the general 
minimum wage, instead of the full rate. This exemption could undermine the 
impact of the rise in the minimum wage that we intend to study, if employers 
decided to declare the worker as an apprentice to get away without paying him the 
full minimum wage. 
Our study concentrates on the changes that took place in 1987. These changes in 
the legal framework of the minimum wage in Portugal define the setting for a 
quasi-experiment in economics, as first argued by Pereira, who used in her study 
the second change described (for more details, see Pereira (1999)). 
3. Overview: aggregate data suggest that youth employment increased 
following a sharp rise in the youth minimum wage 
Preliminary evidence on the impact of the rise in the minimum wage, based on 
aggregate figures, suggests that traditional economic theory is challenged. The 
evidence is instead consistent with the literature indicating that a rise in the 
minimum wage does not inexorably lead to declining employment. 
Note first of all the impact of the legal changes on the average wage of the 
different age groups, relying on three cross-sections of data. 
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Table 2 – Growth in the average wage of full-time wage earners, by age group, 1986-1989 (*) 
Age 1987 1988 1989 
16 1.16 1.21 1.17 
17 1.21 1.14 1.15 
18 1.21 1.12 1.13 
19 1.18 1.12 1.13 
20 1.15 1.11 1.13 
21 1.14 1.12 1.12 
22 1.14 1.12 1.13 
23 1.14 1.12 1.14 
24 1.14 1.12 1.14 
25-29 1.14 1.10 1.13 
30-34 1.15 1.10 1.15 
35-39 1.14 1.09 1.13 
40-65 1.16 1.11 1.14 
>=66 1.16 1.12 1.13 
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTS (1986-1989). 
Note: (*) Computed as 1,, −tata ww , where aw  stands for the average wage of the age group a, 
and the subscript t denotes time. 
Wages increased most sharply precisely for the groups of workers affected by the 
rise in the minimum wage (see highlights in bold). Between 1986 and 1987, the 
average wage for workers aged 17, 18 or 19 increased the most, while all the 
other age categories had a much lower and very homogeneous wage growth. The 
rise in the legal minimum wage thus seems to have had a relevant impact on the 
wages of the eligible workers, indicating that the possibility to declare a worker as 
an apprentice was not extensively used by employers3. The same pattern holds 
for the year afterwards, as the groups of workers affected by changes in the 
minimum wage — those aged 16 or less — saw their average wage rise the most. 
Visual inspection of the wage distribution stresses the relevance of the changes 
that took place. 
                                            
3
 Note also that the share of apprentices in the age categories directly affected by the change in 
the legislation did not increase during this period (see appendix). 
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In 1986, the wage distribution for teenagers aged 17 to 19 presented a sharp peak 
at 75% of the national minimum wage. That was precisely the subminimum wage 
legally allowed for workers aged 18 or 19. The distribution presented a less 
pronounced peak at the full minimum wage. By 1987, the subminimum wage peak 
had almost vanished, and the share of teens at the current minimum wage had 
increased sharply. The kernel plot therefore indicates that compliance to the new 
minimum wage regulation was widespread, as the rise in the applicable minimum 
wage did shift subminimum teenager wages to the new minimum wage level. 
The impact on employment resulting from these sharp wage changes does not 
exhibit the pattern predicted by competitive theory. 
Table 3 – Growth in number of full-time wage-earners by age groups, 1986-1989 (*) 
age 1987 1988 1989 
16 1.060 1.148 1.092 
17 1.052 1.094 1.119 
18 1.043 1.090 1.106 
19 1.061 1.066 1.108 
20 1.086 1.042 1.108 
21 1.082 1.051 1.088 
22 1.109 1.054 1.099 
23 1.063 1.083 1.095 
24 1.055 1.041 1.136 
25-29 1.014 0.995 1.071 
30-34 1.023 1.002 1.032 
35-39 1.029 0.983 1.001 
40-65 1.027 0.996 1.049 
>=66 1.041 0.988 1.096 
total 1.033 1.012 1.077 
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTS (1986-1989). 
Note: (*) Computed as 1,, −tata LL , where aL  stands for employment of age group a, and the 
subscript t denotes time. 
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While total employment increased by 3.3% between 1986 and 1987, the number 
of jobs taken by workers aged 17 to 19 increased more sharply, by 4% to 6%. 
Nevertheless, the group aged 20 to 22 presented even higher employment growth 
rates. The following year, while total employment increased by 1%, the youngest 
workers had a much higher employment growth, which compensated for the 
decline in the employment of prime-age workers. This level of analysis therefore 
dismisses the existence of any negative impact on employment resulting from the 
sharp rise in the minimum wage for specific age groups. 
A longitudinal perspective can shed another light on the issue. Following workers 
over time, we can directly check whether youngsters who were earning sub-
minimum wages tended to loose their jobs following the sharp increase in their 
legal minimum wage. Results reinforce the initial hint, as the rise in the minimum 
wage did not have the negative employment consequences predicted by 
traditional economic theory. 
Table 4 – Mobility out of employment for 1986 full-time wage-earners, by age and wage categories 
situation in 1987 age in 
1986 wage in 1986 employed full-time 
wage earner 
not full-time 
out of 
employment 
16-18 below minimum 65.96 4.24 29.80 
 at minimum 59.91 3.66 36.42 
 between min86 and min87 75.65 4.41 19.94 
 at/barely above min87 * 67.87 4.10 28.03 
 above min87 x 1.1 71.72 4.71 23.57 
19-25 below minimum 56.55 5.12 38.33 
 at minimum 57.63 3.26 39.11 
 between min86 and min87 67.66 4.79 27.54 
 at/barely above min87 * 65.91 4.32 29.77 
 above min87 x 1.1 71.66 3.70 24.64 
26-35 below minimum 56.67 6.32 37.02 
 at minimum 60.06 3.45 36.49 
 between min86 and min87 70.64 5.46 23.89 
 at/barely above min87 * 71.83 4.32 23.85 
 above min87 x 1.1 78.09 3.56 18.36 
36-65 below minimum 45.61 22.85 31.53 
 at minimum 23.7 3.75 72.55 
 between min86 and min87 56.67 6.32 37.02 
 at/barely above min87 * 60.06 3.45 36.49 
 above min87 x 1.1 70.64 5.46 23.89 
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTS (1986-1987). 
Note: (*) “Barely above” is defined as not exceeding the minimum plus 10%. 
Workers aged 16 to 18 and earning sub-minimum wages in 1986 were a year later 
eligible for a sharp wage rise. These workers would therefore, according to 
competitive theory, be at risk of loosing their job. Indeed, if workers were paid the 
value of their marginal product, the rise in the minimum wage would drive sub-
minimum workers out of employment. Instead, table 4 shows that, in the age 
groups affected, the share of workers who remain in employment is higher for 
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those initially earning the sub-minimum wage than for those at the full minimum. 
Whereas 66% of the youngsters aged 16 to 18 employed at sub-minimum wages 
in 1986 were still employed a year later, just 60% of those earning the full 
minimum kept their employment status. 
If instead of taking teenagers at the minimum wage as the control group, we 
consider older workers on sub-minimum wages, similar results are reached. The 
share of subminimum wage workers remaining in employment is higher in the 
ages directly affected by the rise in the minimum wage than for older workers. 
4. Modelling both sides of the recruitment policy of the firm: job accessions 
versus job separations 
Firms may change the composition of their labour force following a rise in the 
minimum wage for a particular group of workers, namely to get rid of workers 
whose marginal productivity falls below the new minimum wage. This section 
models job flows distinguishing between: hirings by companies newly set; 
dismissals from companies that close down; hirings by continuing firms; 
separations from continuing firms.  
We will concentrate on the share of teenagers in total job accessions/separations 
involving workers aged up to 35 years. Whereas overall figures for job accessions 
and separations may be influenced by the business cycle, concentrating on the 
share of teenagers in those flows can highlight changes in employer policies 
following the rise in the youth minimum wage. Indeed, considering just the flows 
for workers aged up to 35 we are comparing similar groups, expected to be 
affected in a similar way by trends in the business cycle. 
Insight into the impact of minimum wages on worker flows was obtained via 
regression analysis. Since the number of teenage workers is taken as the 
dependent variable, a count regression model is appropriate, particularly because 
the number of events exhibits a preponderance of zeros and small values. 
The Poisson regression model, for grouped data, writes as: 
{ }{ })x|(g N)x( βµ =      (1) 
where )(xµ  is the expected value of the number of events (in this case, the 
number of teenage workers), x is the vector of explanatory variables and β the 
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vector of the corresponding coefficients, and N denotes the size of the risk set in 
the units in which the events occur (in this case, the firm’s flow of workers less or 
equal than 35 years of age). 
The loglinear model corresponding to this specification (for N counts with 
independent Poisson distribution), is: 
βµ 'x
N
)x(ln =



     (2) 
where )x(
N
)x( λµ =  is the rate of incidence of the event (the proportion of 
teenage workers). 
With s independent groups (s firms) each with a vector xi=(xi1, xi2,…,xik) of k 
explanatory variables, the likelihood function is given by 
{ }∏
=
−=
s
i
ii
n
i !n/)exp()|n(L i
1
µµµ .      (3) 
The corresponding log likelihood estimating equation is: 
∑ −−+=
i
iiiiiii nNxNnxnL )!ln()'exp(ln'ln ββ    (4) 
Because of overdispersion, the variance function (V) is allowed to have a 
multiplicative factor φ, (V(µ)=φµ), which is obtained dividing the deviance by the 
degrees of freedom. The model is estimated by quasi-likelihood techniques. 
To compare the before and after treatment situations for the affected group with 
that of the control group, the most common methodology has been the 'difference 
in differences' approach, which accounts for permanent heterogeneity across the 
groups and for business cycle effects. In that case, the difference between 
                                            
4
 For details, see Cameron and Trivedi (1998). 

 For the Poisson distribution, the deviance is computed as  
{ }∑ −−
i
iiiiii )n()/nln(nw µµ2 , 
where wi is the known dispersion weight. 

 Allowing for overdispersion has no effects on the parameter estimates. However, the procedure 
adopted implies that the covariance matrix is multiplied by φ and the scale deviance and the log 
likelihoods used in likelihood ratio tests are divided by φ. 
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employment before and after the rise in the minimum wage (the 'first difference') is 
computed for each group of workers, cancelling out permanent characteristics of 
the group; the difference between these two measures is the 'second difference', 
quantifying the impact of the treatment, which is not influenced by macroeconomic 
shocks affecting both groups of workers in the same way. Contrasts and 
similarities with the methodology we are using should be highlighted. 
Our methodology similarly takes into account four different groups of workers: 
teenagers (aged 17 to 19, the treatment group), older workers (aged 20 to 35, the 
control group), each before and after the rise in the minimum wage. Instead of 
relating the four groups using two differences, we use one ratio and one 
difference, which should as well control for macroeconomic shocks affecting both 
groups and for permanent differences between the treatment and control groups. 
On the other hand, instead of dealing with the stock of employment before and 
after the legislation change, we are interested in two other variables, which are the 
sources of employment changes — job accessions and job separations (each 
requiring, for its computation, data on the period they refer to plus data on the 
previous period). Finally, instead of ordinary least squares, a Poisson regression 
model is more adequate in this framework. 
4.1. Trends in continuing firms 
Consider first the recruitment and dismissal policy in continuing firms. The first 
regression in table 5 compares the recruitment policy in 1986, before the change 
in the minimum wage, with that of 1988, a year and two months after the rise in 
the minimum wage. The second one compares 1986 and 1989, therefore allowing 
for a longer lag on the impact of the minimum wage on recruitment policies. Data 
for the control year of 1986 and the year under analysis (1988 or 1989) have been 
pooled, and a year dummy variable aims at capturing the impact of the policy 
change. The affected groupDQG WKHFRQWUROJURXSZRUNHUVDJHG WR
were kept in the sample. 
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Table 5 – Share of teenagers hired by continuing firms, Poisson regression model applied to 
proportions 
 pooled data 1986 
and 1988 
 pooled data 1986 
and 1989 
 parameter standard  parameter standard 
 estimate error  estimate error 
year 1988 (dummy) -0.046 0.008    
year 1989 (dummy)    -0.056 0.008 
firm size -0.066 0.003  -0.056 0.003 
firm hiring rate -0.060 0.027  -0.014 0.026 
market concentration (Herfindahl index) -0.639 0.045  -0.764 0.046 
      
N 61 379   64 233  
Pearson chi-square 59 405   62 067  
Notes: Controlling for the industry (7 dummies), and public or foreign ownership of the company. 
Firm size is in logs. 
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTS (1985-89). 
After the rise in the youth minimum wage, companies decreased the share of 
teenagers among their newly-hired workforce. Note that both for 1988 and 1989, 
the dummy variable is negative and significant. In 1988, the share of teenagers in 
overall job accessions to continuing firms was 5% lower than in 1986; in 1989, it 
was 6% lower than in 1986. In that sense, results on the behaviour of employers 
concerning their hiring policy following a rise in the minimum wage lend support to 
the competitive view of the labour market, as there seems to have been a shift 
away from teenagers. 
Table 6 – Share of teenagers dismissed from continuing firms, Poisson regression model applied 
to proportions 
 pooled data 1986 
and 1988 
 pooled data 1986 
and 1989 
 parameter standard  parameter standard 
 estimate error  estimate error 
year 1988 (dummy) -0.111 0.008    
year 1989 (dummy)    -0.111 0.008 
firm size -0.062 0.003  -0.064 0.003 
firm separation rate 0.320 0.020  0.359 0.019 
market concentration (Herfindahl index) -0.830 0.049  -1.039 0.052 
      
N 77 725   82 220  
Pearson chi-square 81 299   84 811  
Notes: Controlling for the industry (7 dummies), and public or foreign ownership of the company. 
Firm size is in logs. 
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTS (1985-89). 
However, the share of teenagers in job separations also decreased following the 
rise in the minimum wage. Indeed, it was 11% lower in 1988 or 1989 than in 1986. 
These results contrast with those of the previous table, indicating that the workers 
affected by a sharp rise in the minimum wage are not over-represented among 
those afterwards separating from their employers. 
 14 
These results contrast with those obtained by Pereira (1999). In her outstanding 
study, she found that the rise in youth minimum wage significantly reduced 
employment. However, she has modelled net employment changes at the firm 
level relying on a balanced panel of firms observed before and after the policy 
change.7 This strategy of keeping a balanced panel of firms to analyse net 
employment changes by age groups may bias the results. Workers aged 19 or 18 
in 1986 are bound one or two years later, respectively, to join the control group of 
workers aged 20 to 25. Therefore, the size of the affected group is bound to 
decline while expanding the size of the control group, unless the company sticks 
to a recruitment policy of actively and continuously hiring youngsters. This 
condition is very restrictive, as it would mean a continuous expansion of the 
company's labour force unless workers were exiting at a concomitant pace, a 
situation that may hold for certain sectors with very high worker turnover and 
almost exclusively young workers, such as the fast food industry analysed in the 
USA, but that is less feasible for the Portuguese economy as a whole. An older 
control group would reduce this problem and indeed the results are no longer 
significant in two out of three regressions if workers aged 30 to 35 are taken as 
the control group. Our separate analysis of job accessions and job separations, 
looking at the relevance of teenagers in each of these flows, is meant to overcome 
this problem. Moreover, our coverage of the existing firms in the economy is 
broader, since we have considered all the firms recruiting workers in the year of 
1986, to compare with all the firms that recruited workers in the year of 1988 or 
1989 (similarly for dismissals). In the following section we also take into account 
new firms and firms going out of business. 
4.2. Trends in new firms and in firms closing down 
We go on to inspect the impact of the rise in the minimum wage on firm closure 
and firm creation. This analysis provides a more complete picture of the impact of 
the minimum wage in an economy known to be characterized by very high levels 
of firm creation and firm destruction (Mata and Portugal, 1994) (Mata et al, 1995). 
                                            
7
 As such, her sample includes approximately 22 thousand firms observed in 1986 and 1988 with 
workers aged 18 to 35 (and approximately 20 thousand once the years of 1986 and 1989 are 
considered). 
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Table 7 – Share of teenagers hired by new firms, Poisson regression model applied to proportions 
 pooled data 1986 
and 1988 
 pooled data 1986 
and 1989 
 parameter standard  parameter standard 
 estimate error  estimate error 
year 1988 (dummy) -0.036 0.015    
year 1989 (dummy)    -0.028 0.015 
firm size -0.105 0.006  -0.090 0.006 
market concentration (Herfindahl index) -2.163 0.182  -2.631 0.161 
      
N 22 344   24 177  
Pearson chi-square 21 627   23 778  
Notes: Controlling for the industry (7 dummies), and public or foreign ownership of the company. 
Firm size is in logs. 
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTS (1985-89). 
Firms set in 1988, a year after the policy change, recruited a 4% lower share of 
teenagers than those set in 1986. Just like accessions to continuing firms, these 
results lend support to the idea that rising minimum wages reduce the demand for 
the affected workers. Nevertheless, by 1989 that impact on admissions into new 
firms had vanished. 
Table 8 – Share of teenagers dismissed from firms closing down, Poisson regression model 
applied to proportions 
 pooled data 1986 
and 1988 
 pooled data 1986 
and 1989 
 parameter standard  parameter standard 
 estimate error  estimate error 
year 1988 (dummy) 0.058 0.020    
year 1989 (dummy)    0.059 0.019 
firm size -0.129 0.008  -0.113 0.007 
market concentration (Herfindahl index) -1.661 0.223  -1.876 0.232 
      
N 12 012   13 257  
Pearson chi-square 12 269   13 506  
Notes: Controlling for the industry (7 dummies), and public or foreign ownership of the company. 
Firm size is in logs. 
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTS (1985-89). 
Also in line with traditional theory, we find that teenage workers are over-
represented in the labour force of firms closing down in 1988 or 1989, when 
compared to the situation before the rise in the youth minimum wage. 
In synthesis, looking at firm entry and exit and at recruitment by continuing firms 
would lend support to standard economic theory. As a matter of fact, firms set up 
in 1988 or 1989 increased their tendency to employ older workers when compared 
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to similar firms8 set up in 1986, as the share of teenagers in total hirings declined. 
Also, youngsters were increasingly represented among firms going out of 
business. Pointing in the same direction, their share in total hirings by continuing 
firms declined. However, results for separations from continuing firms reveal that 
job separations for teenagers declined following the rise in the minimum wage. 
The above modelling approach captures mainly demand forces and an analysis 
from a worker point of view could add further light on this issue. 
5. Modelling worker flows: rising minimum wage increases job attachment? 
This section models retention rates from a worker standpoint, specifically for 
youngsters affected by the rise in the minimum wage, compared to a control 
group, to answer the question: did youngsters who were earning sub-minimum 
wages tend to loose their jobs following the sharp increase in their legal minimum 
wage? Before progressing to present the results, let us briefly discuss the 
dependent variable of the logit model, alternative specifications for the minimum 
wage variable, and alternative definitions of the control group and control period. 
The dependent variable 
The model on worker transitions explicitly tests the hypothesis that, when the 
minimum wage is raised, workers in the affected group will have a lower 
probability of keeping their job than unaffected workers. We will model the 
probability that a worker will remain with the same employer. However, the 
probability of loosing a job and becoming unemployed has been more frequently 
debated in the literature and therefore the probability of remaining employed 
(whether or not with the same employer) will also be modelled and its results will 
be presented in appendix. 
The minimum wage variable 
Three alternatives were used to specify the minimum wage variable: 
– Wage gap: according to competitive reasoning, the probability of remaining 
employed should be lower the greater the change required in the worker's wage 
                                            
8
 Firms in the same industry, with the same type of ownership (public, private or foreign), size and 
profitability as proxied by the degree of market concentration. 
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to adjust to the new minimum wage. The distance between the worker's 
previous wage and the new minimum wage (wage gap) has been used in the 
literature as an independent variable to capture the impact of changes in the 
minimum wage (Card and Krueger 1994, Currie and Fallick 1996, Zavodny 
2000). It was computed as: 
i
it
i
w
ww
gapwage
,86
,86min −
=   , 
for worker i, a teenager initially earning subminimum wage w; it is zero 
otherwise. 
– Subminimum wage teenagers: an alternative specification disregards how far 
subminimum wages deviate from the minimum wage, to consider simply 
whether or not a worker was a subminimum wage worker in the initial period. 
– Teenagers: An even more general specification considers simply whether a 
worker is a teenager, to measure the employment impact of a rise in the youth 
minimum wage. 
Sample and control groups 
The treatment and the control groups should be very similar (Meyer 1995). We 
have therefore restricted our analysis to low wage workers aged 16 to 35. The 
behaviour of subminimum wage workers is contrasted against that of other low 
wage workers, defined alternatively as: i) workers at the minimum wage; ii) 
workers marginally above the minimum wage (wage above the minimum but 
below 1.1 x minimum). The later results are reported in appendix. 
The combination of alternative samples and alternative specifications of the 
minimum wage variable defines different treatment and control groups. In tables 9 
to 12, workers below the minimum wage and at the minimum wage are defined as 
the low wage group. The first specification includes a dummy variable for 
teenagers, besides the control variables. Therefore, low wage teenagers (aged 16 
to 18 in 1986) are implicitly taken as the treatment group, and the control group 
are low-wage workers aged 19 to 35. The second specification considers a 
dummy variable for subminimum wage workers, plus that variable interacted with 
the teenager dummy. As such, the treatment group are subminimum wage 
teenagers, compared against subminimum wage workers aged 19 to 35. The third 
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specification highlights, for subminimum wage teenagers, the impact of the 
distance from the new minimum wage on retention probabilities. The same 
specifications of the regressions are combined with the definition of low wage 
workers as those barely above the minimum wage, reported in appendix. 
Period under analysis 
Workers employed in 1986, a year before the rise in the minimum wage, were 
kept for analysis, to explain their probability of remaining employed in 1988, a year 
and two months after the rise in the minimum wage took place.9 
To check that the differences in behaviour that we are capturing are indeed due to 
changes in the minimum wage, and not due to permanent contrasts across the 
groups of workers, the same regressions were ran for a different time period, 
when the impact of the rise in the minimum wage would most certainly already 
have vanished (1991 to 1993). 
Table 9 – Probability of remaining with the same employer from 1986 to 1988, men (logit model) 
 
Sample group: workers below and at the minimum wage 
 parameter standard  parameter standard  parameter standard 
 estimate error  estimate error  estimate error 
intercept -4.445 0.523  -3.53 0.61  -5.246 0.642 
teenager 0.512 0.023       
submin    -0.162 0.024    
submin * teenager    0.574 0.025    
wage gap       0.59 0.044 
tenure 0.075 0.004  0.076 0.004  0.066 0.004 
tenure<1 -0.201 0.023  -0.205 0.023  -0.235 0.023 
apprentice 0.044 0.02  0.049 0.02  0.116 0.019 
wage86 0.331 0.053  0.247 0.061  0.412 0.065 
schooling (7 dummies) yes   yes   yes  
industry (7 dummies) yes   yes   yes  
firm size 0.079 0.006  0.081 0.006  0.091 0.006 
foreign 0.017 0.091  0.026 0.091  -0.004 0.091 
public 0.051 0.121  0.064 0.122  0.067 0.121 
         
N 61 669   61 669   61 669  
Chi-squared 2140.5   2208   1836.3  
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTS (1986-88). 
                                            
9
 We have as well modelled their probability of remaining employed in 1987, two months after the 
rise in the minimum wage, despite this time lag being too short for the change in the legislation to 
have taken effect. For example, Neumark (1999) claims that the effect of changes in the minimum 
wage is felt most strongly with a one year lag. Nevertheless, our results are robust (though not as 
strong as in the reported regressions). Analysing the separations from 1986 to 1989 would be 
strongly influenced by the military draft for males aged 20-21 in 1989 and therefore we have not 
progressed to consider that longer lag. Note however that eighteen year olds in 1986 were already 
affected by the military service in 1988. 
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Table 10  Probability of remaining with the same employer from 1986 to 1988, women (logit 
model) 
 
Sample group: workers below and at the minimum wage 
 parameter standard  parameter standard  parameter standard 
 estimate error  estimate error  estimate error 
intercept -4.802 0.568  -5.41 0.673  -4.58 0.647 
teenager 0.237 0.025       
submin    0.005 0.022    
submin * teenager    0.275 0.027    
wage gap       0.239 0.05 
tenure 0.044 0.003  0.044 0.003  0.04 0.003 
tenure<1 -0.291 0.022  -0.288 0.022  -0.308 0.022 
apprentice 0.133 0.02  0.126 0.02  0.16 0.019 
wage86 0.375 0.057  0.437 0.067  0.353 0.065 
schooling (7 dummies) yes   yes   yes  
industry (7 dummies) yes   yes   yes  
firm size 0.122 0.007  0.121 0.007  0.128 0.007 
foreign 0.282 0.044  0.284 0.044  0.281 0.044 
public 0.162 0.118  0.17 0.118  0.142 0.118 
         
N 59 825   59 825   59 825  
Chi-squared 2207.2   2227.9   2141.8  
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTS (1986-88). 
Teenagers were more likely to keep their jobs, from 1986 to 1988, than older 
workers (see specification 1 in tables 9 and 10). Looking at the second 
specification, a consistent pattern emerges. In general, male workers on 
subminimum wages are more likely to leave their job (see the coefficient on the 
subminimum variable), which could partly be associated with poor job satisfaction 
resulting from a low wage. However, teenagers earning subminimum wages in 
1986 are much more likely to remain with their employer than subminimum wage 
workers in general. The change in the legislation led to a wage rise that may have 
increased job attachment for the affected group of workers. The wage gap 
variable (specification 3) is as well positive and highly significant, revealing that 
teenagers initially earning the lowest wages, and therefore subject to the highest 
wage raise, are the workers most likely to stick to their employers. These effects 
are robust to the choice of the control group, be it workers at the minimum wage 
or marginally above the minimum (see tables B2 and B3 in appendix). The 
magnitude of the effects is much larger for men than for women.10 
We have tested whether these results hold when analysing the probability that the 
worker will remain employed, whether or not with the same employer, since that is 
                                            
10
 The wage of the worker was included among the regressors. Following Abowd et al (1999), it is 
intended to capture heterogeneity in labour force attachment across the wage distribution. 
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the central variable in most of the previous literature. The previous results do hold, 
revealing that, after the rise in the youth minimum wage, teenagers were more 
likely to remain employed than older workers, and subminimum wage teenagers 
were more likely to remain employed than older subminimum wage workers 
(tables B4 to B7 in appendix). 
What if minimum wages had not increased? Would teenagers have shown the 
same pattern of behaviour anyway? Interestingly, that pattern of behaviour 
changes considerably once the impact of the rise in the minimum has vanished. 
The wage gap variable becomes irrelevant in explaining the probability that a men 
will remain with the same employer from 1991 to 1993; the impact of being a 
subminimum wage teenager is halved (second specification in table 15); the 
impact of being a teenager is cut by a factor of four (see the first specification). 
For women, the results are less clear-cut. Women reveal basically the same 
pattern of behaviour in both periods (1986-88 and 1991-93), irrespective of the 
rise in the youth minimum wage in 1987. 
Table 11  Probability of remaining with the same employer from 1991 to 1993, men (logit model) 
 
Sample group: workers below and at the minimum wage 
 parameter standard  Parameter standard  parameter standard 
 estimate error  Estimate error  estimate error 
Intercept -6.655 0.747  -7.287 0.927  -5.187 0.851 
teenager 0.116 0.022       
submin    -0.083 0.025    
submin * teenager    0.248 0.025    
wage gap       -0.03 0.064 
tenure 0.068 0.004  0.07 0.0042  0.064 0.004 
tenure<1 -0.396 0.021  -0.391 0.021  -0.402 0.021 
apprentice 0.089 0.02  0.069 0.02  0.124 0.019 
wage91 0.571 0.071  0.634 0.087  0.433 0.08 
schooling (7 dummies) yes   yes   yes  
industry (7 dummies) yes   yes   yes  
firm size -0.004 0.005  -0.006 0.006  0 0.005 
foreign -0.06 0.071  -0.051 0.071  -0.074 0.071 
public -0.076 0.179  -0.075 0.179  -0.083 0.179 
         
N 62 474   62 474   62 474  
chi-squared 1771.8   1837.4   1745.4  
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTS (1991-93). 
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Table 12  Probability of remaining with the same employer from 1991 to 1993, women (logit 
model) 
 
Sample group: workers below and at the minimum wage 
 parameter standard  parameter standard  parameter standard 
 estimate error  estimate error  estimate error 
intercept -9.057 0.776  -7.55 0.926  -8.18 0.844 
teenager 0.225 0.021       
submin    -0.151 0.023    
submin * teenager    0.321 0.023    
wage gap       0.266 0.067 
tenure 0.048 0.003  0.05 0.003  0.045 0.003 
tenure<1 -0.383 0.019  -0.38 0.019  -0.4 0.018 
apprentice 0.082 0.018  0.069 0.018  0.117 0.017 
wage91 0.79 0.073  0.651 0.087  0.706 0.08 
schooling (7 dummies) yes   yes   yes  
industry (7 dummies) yes   yes   yes  
firm size 0.11 0.006  0.117 0.006  0.113 0.006 
foreign -0.016 0.037  -0.017 0.037  -0.03 0.037 
public -1.008 0.167  -1.04 0.168  -1.01 0.167 
         
N 72788   72788   72788  
Chi-squared 2300.7   2395.1   2200.5  
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTS (1991-93). 
These results contrast with those obtained in several previous studies. In the work 
by Currie and Fallick (1996) for the USA, the affected group of workers was found 
to have lower probability of remaining employed than low wage workers who were 
not affected by the rise in the minimum wage. Similarly, the larger the wage gap, 
and therefore the larger the wage increase due, the lower the probability that the 
worker remained employed. Zavodny (2000) found that the probability to remain 
employed in the USA following a rise in the minimum wage is lower for low wage 
teens than for high wage teens. Abowd et al (1999) as well found that 
disemployment effects are more pronounced for workers directly affected by the 
rise in the minimum wage than for those initially marginally above the new 
minimum wage. 
Neumark and Wascher (1995, 1995a) explicitly considered supply side effects. 
They concluded that, following a rise in the minimum wage, high-skill teenagers 
may leave school to start working, substituting for low-skilled teens, whose 
marginal revenue falls below the new minimum wage. According to Neumark and 
Wascher, the weak youth disemployment effects detected by some studies could 
result simply from the fact that teenagers are encouraged to leave school, driving 
out of work less skilled teens previously employed. In that case there would be 
strong disemployment effects on teenagers already in work, but they would not be 
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captured by the analysis, just because there would be rising demand (and supply) 
for more skilled youngsters. Explicitly modelling the retention rates, we do not find 
support for that hypothesis for the Portuguese case, as the retention rate is higher 
for teens earning subminimum wages than for the unaffected groups of workers. 
Moreover, the fact that, following the rise in the youth minimum wage, there is a 
decrease in the opportunities for job accessions by teenage relative to older 
workers, as shown in section 3, reduces the impact that the minimum wage might 
have pulling teenagers out of school. 
6. Conclusion 
This study goes beyond the explanation of net employment changes by worker 
types at the firm level following a rise in the minimum wage. It models gross job 
flows — both accessions and separations — in continuing firms, as well as in new 
firms and those going out of business, relying on a matched employer-employee 
panel dataset. We have also modelled worker behaviour following the rise in the 
minimum wage. Scrutiny of the sources of changes in employment for the affected 
group of workers can help reconcile some of the evidence that had previously 
been presented in the literature as contradictory, contributing to disentangle the 
minimum wage puzzle. 
It has previously been documented that low wage workers in general have higher 
turnover rates, either because they have less incentives to remain with their 
employer, thus being more prone to quit, or because they are the first to be 
dismissed in case of adverse conditions. Our evidence is consistent with that 
view. A general pattern emerges, with workers earning below the minimum 
generally presenting lower retention rates, and those earning higher wages 
revealing higher propensity to remain in employment. 
Concentrating on the impact of changes in the minimum wage, our results are as 
well consistent with the idea that employers change the demand for labour against 
youngsters once the youth minimum wage is increased. In fact, the share of 
teenagers among newly hired workers in continuing firms decreases, indicating a 
substitution effect away from youngsters. Also, new firms decrease the share of 
youngsters they hire. Moreover, teenagers are over-represented in firms closing 
down after the rise in the youth minimum wage. 
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However, the previous results capture mainly demand side effects and the picture 
changes considerably once the retention of workers in the firm is analysed. In fact, 
the share of teenagers in job separations in continuing firms decreases following 
the rise in the minimum wage. From a worker perspective, we find that teenagers 
are much more prone to keep their employment following a rise in the youth 
minimum wage than older workers, and subminimum wage teenagers are more 
prone to keep their employment than other subminimum wage workers. This result 
points to the relevance of supply side factors, as job attachment for low wage 
youngsters may rise following an increase in their minimum wage, reducing the 
high job turnover that is characteristic of low wage workers. 
The major impact of the minimum wage is therefore the reduction of quits and in 
general the reduction of separations from the employer, which compensates for 
the reduction of accessions (to new and continuing firms) and the rising dismissals 
from firms closing down. 
For women the results are not as clear. Since women tend to have a more stable 
attachment to their employer, switching jobs less frequently, there is thus less 
room to compensate for the negative impact that rising minimum wages have on 
employment through the reduction of accessions. As such, the literature has most 
often found that women are more severely hit by a rising minimum wage. 
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Appendix A: Dataset and concepts used 
This study is based on a longitudinal data set matching firms and workers in the 
Portuguese economy, from 1985 to 1993. Both units can be followed over time. 
The data set is gathered every year by the Ministry of Employment and Solidarity, 
based on a inquiry that every establishment with wage-earners is legally obliged 
to fill in. The response rate is extremely high, and in fact the population of firms 
with wage-earners in manufacturing and the services private sector, is covered. 
No restrictions are imposed on the wage-earners covered (for example, there are 
no age restrictions and no limits beyond which wages would not be reported). 
Reported data include the firm’s location, industry, employment, sales, ownership, 
legal setting, and the worker’s gender, age, skill, occupation, schooling, admission 
date, earnings, duration of work, as well as the mechanism of wage bargaining. 
Each firm entering the database is assigned a unique identifying number and it 
can thus be followed over time. The Ministry implements several checks to ensure 
that a firm that has already reported to the database is not assigned a different 
identification number. The worker identification number is based on a 
transformation of his/her social security number. 
A firm is considered a new firm if it had never previously reported to Quadros de 
Pessoal. A firm is reported as having gone out of business the first year it fails to 
report if it never again returns to the data base. A firm is considered a continuing 
one if it reported both in the previous and the current period. The regressions on 
the share of teenagers recruited by continuing firms includes all continuing firms 
that recruited workers. Similarly, the regressions for dismissals by continuing firms 
include all the continuing firms that dismissed workers. 
Out of approximately 100 thousand companies reporting to Quadros de Pessoal 
each year in mid-'eighties, the following meet the sampling criteria. 
Table A1 – Sample sizes (number of firms with workers in the age bracket 16-35) 
 pooled 1986 and 1988 pooled 1986 and 1989 
new firms 22 344 24 177 
firms out of business 12 012 13 257 
continuing firms that hired workers 61 379 64 233 
continuing firms that dismissed workers 77 725 82 220 
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Since the minimum wage in Portugal is defined as a monthly wage rate, only full-
time wage earners were considered in the analysis. The wage in the analysis 
refers to the reported base monthly wage. 
Appendix B: Additional tables 
Table B1 – Share of apprentices, by age group, 1985-1989 
      % 
age 1986 1987 1988 1989 
16 0.838 0.847 0.837 0.835 
17 0.779 0.774 0.761 0.761 
18 0.625 0.617 0.597 0.583 
19 0.493 0.503 0.483 0.459 
20 0.349 0.367 0.372 0.357 
21 0.250 0.281 0.283 0.286 
22 0.197 0.213 0.230 0.224 
23 0.153 0.175 0.182 0.184 
24 0.120 0.138 0.150 0.147 
25-29 0.058 0.073 0.082 0.090 
30-34 0.025 0.034 0.034 0.000 
35-39 0.016 0.022 0.022 0.000 
40-65 0.010 0.014 0.012 0.000 
>=66 0.021 0.026 0.027 0.000 
Total 0.104 0.116 0.122 0.127 
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTS (1986-1989). 
 26 
Table B2 – Probability of remaining with the same employer from 1986 to 1988, men (logit model) 
 
Sample group: workers below and ABOVE the minimum wage 
 parameter standard  parameter standard  parameter standard 
 estimate error  estimate error  estimate error 
intercept -5.796 0.49  -4.06 0.607  -6.94 0.597 
teenager 0.506 0.023       
submin    -0.212 0.024    
submin * teenager    0.548 0.025    
wage gap       0.618 0.043 
tenure 0.064 0.003  0.061 0.003  0.056 0.003 
tenure<1 -0.213 0.023  -0.224 0.023  -0.24 0.023 
apprentice 0.044 0.02  0.076 0.02  0.132 0.019 
wage86 0.473 0.049  0.312 0.06  0.589 0.06 
schooling (7 dummies) yes   yes   yes  
industry (7 dummies) yes   yes   yes  
firm size 0.072 0.005  0.07 0.006  0.081 0.005 
foreign 0.104 0.076  0.099 0.076  0.078 0.076 
public 0.08 0.102  0.107 0.102  0.101 0.102 
         
N 66876   66876   66876  
Chi-squared 2495.2   2535.2   2198.9  
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTS (1986-88). 
Table B3 – Probability of remaining with the same employer from 1986 to 1988, women (logit 
model) 
 
Sample group: workers below and ABOVE the minimum wage 
 parameter standard  parameter standard  parameter standard 
 estimate error  estimate error  estimate error 
intercept -8.42 0.518  -5.182 0.666  -9.004 0.589 
teenager 0.224 0.024       
submin    -0.203 0.022    
submin * teenager    0.243 0.026    
wage gap       0.335 0.049 
tenure 0.03 0.002  0.029 0.002  0.028 0.002 
tenure<1 -0.329 0.022  -0.332 0.022  -0.341 0.022 
apprentice 0.106 0.02  0.124 0.02  0.135 0.019 
wage86 0.777 0.052  0.466 0.067  0.836 0.059 
schooling (7 dummies) yes   yes   yes  
industry (7 dummies) yes   yes   yes  
firm size 0.133 0.006  0.13 0.006  0.136 0.006 
foreign 0.385 0.038  0.388 0.038  0.387 0.038 
public 0.262 0.109  0.3 0.109  0.253 0.109 
         
N 76033   76033   76033  
Chi-squared 3271.4   3347.937   3228.4  
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTS (1986-88). 
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Table B4 – Probability of remaining employed from 1986 to 1988, men (logit model) 
 
Sample group: workers below and AT the minimum wage 
 parameter standard  parameter standard  parameter standard 
 estimate error  estimate error  estimate error 
intercept -1.304 0.501  -0.778 0.59  -2.56 0.604 
teenager 0.388 0.023       
submin    -0.114 0.023    
submin * teenager    0.446 0.024    
wage gap       0.527 0.042 
tenure 0.052 0.004  0.052 0.004  0.045 0.004 
tenure<1 -0.043 0.022  -0.045 0.022  -0.067 0.022 
apprentice -0.035 0.019  -0.034 0.019  0.013 0.018 
wage86 0.087 0.05  0.04 0.059  0.214 0.061 
schooling (7 dummies) yes   Yes   yes  
industry (7 dummies) yes   yes   yes  
firm size 0.056 0.006  0.057 0.0057  0.064 0.005 
foreign -0.059 0.088  -0.051 0.088  -0.071 0.088 
public -0.033 0.119  -0.024 0.119  -0.021 0.118 
         
N 61669   61669   61669  
Chi-squared 1154.5   1215.3   1014.8  
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTS (1986-88). 
 
 
Table B5 – Probability of remaining employed from 1986 to 1988, men (logit model) 
 
Sample group: workers below and ABOVE the minimum wage 
 parameter standard  parameter standard  parameter standard 
 estimate error  estimate error  estimate error 
intercept -2.982 0.473  -1.081 0.587  -4.605 0.565 
teenager 0.401 0.022       
submin    -0.208 0.023    
submin * teenager    0.443 0.024    
wage gap       0.582 0.041 
tenure 0.045 0.003  0.042 0.003  0.039 0.003 
tenure<1 -0.073 0.022  -0.08 0.022  -0.093 0.022 
apprentice -0.06 0.019  -0.033 0.019  0.002 0.018 
wage86 0.264 0.048  0.086 0.058  0.427 0.057 
schooling (7 dummies) yes   yes   yes  
industry (7 dummies) yes   yes   yes  
firm size 0.043 0.005  0.04 0.005  0.048 0.005 
foreign 0.081 0.076  0.077 0.076  0.065 0.076 
public -0.048 0.101  -0.023 0.101  -0.03 0.101 
         
N 66876   66876   66876  
Chi-squared 1313.7   1393.6   1182.9  
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTS (1986-88). 
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Table B6 – Probability of remaining employed from 1986 to 1988, women (logit model) 
 
Sample group: workers below and AT the minimum wage 
 parameter standard  parameter standard  parameter standard 
 estimate error  estimate error  estimate error 
intercept -1.58 0.564  -2.351 0.672  -1.385 0.636 
teenager 0.225 0.026       
submin    0.027 0.022    
submin * teenager    0.245 0.027    
wage gap       0.232 0.05 
tenure 0.024 0.003  0.023 0.003  0.021 0.003 
tenure<1 -0.26 0.022  -0.258 0.022  -0.276 0.022 
apprentice 0.176 0.019  0.173 0.019  0.2 0.019 
wage86 0.117 0.057  0.194 0.067  0.097 0.064 
schooling (7 dummies) yes   yes   yes  
industry (7 dummies) yes   yes   yes  
firm size 0.078 0.007  0.076 0.007  0.083 0.007 
foreign 0.078 0.046  0.082 0.046  0.077 0.046 
public -0.066 0.119  -0.06 0.119  -0.085 0.119 
         
N 59825   59825   59825  
Chi-squared 1517.9   1525.3   1464.9  
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTS (1986-88). 
 
Table B7 – Probability of remaining employed from 1986 to 1988, women (logit model) 
 
Sample group: workers below and ABOVE the minimum wage 
 parameter standard  parameter standard  parameter standard 
 estimate error  estimate error  estimate error 
intercept -5.38 0.518  -1.829 0.667  -6.034 0.583 
teenager 0.219 0.024       
submin    -0.218 0.022    
submin * teenager    0.226 0.027    
wage gap       0.343 0.049 
tenure 0.015 0.002  0.013 0.002  0.012 0.002 
tenure<1 -0.296 0.022  -0.298 0.022  -0.306 0.022 
apprentice 0.124 0.02  0.144 0.02  0.15 0.019 
wage86 0.53 0.052  0.187 0.066  0.595 0.059 
schooling (7 dummies) yes   yes   yes  
industry (7 dummies) yes   yes   yes  
firm size 0.087 0.006  0.083 0.006  0.089 0.006 
foreign 0.21 0.04  0.213 0.04  0.211 0.04 
public 0.077 0.112  0.112 0.112  0.07 0.112 
         
N 76033   76033   76033  
Chi-squared 1942   2026.2   1912.7  
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTS (1986-88). 
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Table B8 – Probability of remaining with the same employer from 1991 to 1993, men (logit model) 
 
Sample group: workers below and ABOVE the minimum wage 
 parameter standard  parameter standard  parameter standard 
 estimate error  estimate error  estimate error 
intercept -8.39 0.677  -7.24 0.916  -7.534 0.765 
teenager 0.125 0.022       
submin    -0.136 0.026    
submin * teenager    0.236 0.025    
wage gap       0.045 0.064 
tenure 0.063 0.003  0.062 0.003  0.06 0.003 
tenure<1 -0.413 0.021  -0.414 0.021  -0.416 0.02 
apprentice 0.055 0.021  0.049 0.02  0.095 0.019 
wage91 0.733 0.064  0.63 0.086  0.652 0.072 
schooling (7 dummies) yes   yes   yes  
industry (7 dummies) yes   yes   yes  
firm size 0.018 0.005  0.015 0.005  0.021 0.005 
foreign -0.149 0.061  -0.143 0.061  -0.159 0.061 
public -0.183 0.132  -0.193 0.132  -0.189 0.132 
         
N 65714   65714   65714  
Chi-squared 2613.3   2675.5   2582.1  
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTS (1991-93). 
 
Table B9 – Probability of remaining with the same employer from 1991 to 1993, women (logit 
model) 
 
Sample group: workers below and ABOVE the minimum wage 
 parameter standard  parameter standard  parameter standard 
 estimate error  estimate error  estimate error 
intercept -12.472 0.625  -8.767 0.887  -12.5 0.686 
teenager 0.202 0.018       
submin    -0.191 0.021    
submin * teenager    0.297 0.023    
wage gap       0.376 0.066 
tenure 0.03 0.002  0.028 0.002  0.028 0.002 
tenure<1 -0.373 0.016  -0.374 0.016  -0.385 0.016 
apprentice 0.062 0.016  0.074 0.016  0.098 0.016 
wage91 1.113 0.059  0.769 0.083  1.114 0.065 
schooling (7 dummies) yes   yes   yes  
industry (7 dummies) yes   yes   yes  
firm size 0.133 0.005  0.133 0.005  0.134 0.005 
foreign -0.02 0.025  -0.016 0.025  -0.026 0.025 
public -0.714 0.123  -0.713 0.123  -0.719 0.123 
         
N 116150   116150   116150  
Chi-squared 4471.7   4570.8   4379.8  
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTS (1991-93). 
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